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“Form is the sworn enemy of arbitrariness, the twin sister of liberty.”1 In this 
spirit, the role of a well-regulated administrative process in securing liberty has been 
emphasized repeatedly.  Like its Member States, the European Community (EC) has 
submitted itself to the principle of the rule of law, including the obligation to adhere to 
impartial and fair administrative procedure. 
This Article examines the requirements set down in the case law of the Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance that serve to guarantee a fair and impartial 
administrative process.  It also considers whether improvements should be made to the 
design of the administrative process and, if so, what kind.  The survey is not 
exhaustive but concentrates on selected questions that are essential in practice.  The 
Article’s scope is defined by exploring, in some depth, the two terms key  to this 
discussion―“direct” and “indirect” implementation of administrative law. 
A. Judicial Review 
In Les Verts v. Parliament,2 the European Court of Justice emphasized that the 
European Community is a community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither 
its Member States nor its institutions can avoid judicial review of their actions to 
determine whether those actions are in conformity with the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (“Treaty”).  The Treaty has established a complete system of 
legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance to review the legality of measures adopted by the EC’s institutions.3  At 
present, under Article 230(4) of the Treaty, individuals have access to the European 
Courts only if the act in question directly and individually concerns the complainant.  
For this reason, the system of legal remedies has often been criticized as being too 
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 1. R. VON IHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN DER 
ENTWICKLUNG II, 471 (3d ed. 1874) (opus on the spirit of Roman law). 
 2. Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1357, para. 23.  The Court already mentioned the 
principle of the rule of law in the earlier Case 101/78, Granaria B. V. v. Hoofdproduktschap voor 
Akkerbouwprodukten, 1979 E.C.R. 623, para. 5. 
 3. Case C-50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 2002  E.C.R. I-6677, para. 38. 
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narrow, particularly regarding direct legal protection of individuals against general 
legal acts.  The Court of Justice has recently pointed out, however, that broadening 
access to judicial review by allowing individuals to seek remedies against general 
legal acts—contrary to the wording of Article 230(4) of the Treaty—would go beyond 
its powers as a court. Instead, it is the responsibility of the Member States to alter their 
statutory provisions to create legal remedies for individuals.4  Notably, in the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the European Convention has proposed that 
legal protection should be extended “against a regulatory act which is of direct 
concern to [the complainant] and does not entail implementing measures.”5  This 
seems to be an acceptable compromise between the necessities of adequate judicial 
protection of the individual and the prevailing view in the Member States that general 
legal acts should as a matter of principle not be subject to direct judicial challenges by 
individuals. 
 The central provision governing the principles of judicial review is Article 230 of 
the Treaty.  Following the model of French administrative law, Article 230(2) states 
four grounds of action to annul an administrative action: lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of 
any rule of law relating to its application, and misuse of powers.  That infringement of 
an essential procedural requirement is stated separately is remarkable since it is 
already covered by the general provision of Art. 230 (2) (infringement of the Treaty or 
of any rule of law relating to its application).6 
 Article 230 deals with the judicial control of administrative procedure in the 
narrow sense―specifically, infringement of an essential procedural requirement.  It 
also includes certain aspects of substantive grounds for annulment, such as 
infringement of the Treaty or infringement of any rule of law relating to its 
application.  The latter issues represent some of the most interesting and most recent 
developments in the case law of the European Courts. 
B. European Administrative Procedure 
There is no single European administrative procedure.  But direct administrative 
implementation of Community law (that is, administration carried out by Community 
institutions) is distinct from indirect administrative implementation (that is, 
administration carried out by the Member States).  The vast majority of Community 
law is still implemented by national authorities.  Administrative procedure in indirect 
administration lacks uniformity because of the principle of administrative autonomy— 
that is, that national authorities follow national procedural rules.   
It is settled case-law that in the absence of Community rules governing the matter it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having 
jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding 
rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, however, that such rules are 
                                                          
 4. Id. at para. 39.  For a further discussion of this case see J. SCHWARZE, DEUTSCHES 
VERWALTUNGSBLATT  1297 (2002). 
 5. TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, art. III-365, para. 4, 2004 O. J. (C 310) 1. 
 6. D. Booß, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION: KOMMENTAR, Art. 230 para. 94 (E. Grabitz & 
M. Hilf, eds.). 
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not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of 
equivalence) and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of 
rights conferred by Community law (the principle of effectiveness).7 
Notwithstanding national autonomy, the need for equity and effectiveness has led to 
considerable Community influence on national administrative law and procedure.   
The preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice have been particularly influential. 
This Article focuses primarily on the first area: the direct implementation of 
European law by European institutions.  In this field a uniform set of principles, the 
“European Administrative Procedure,” can be identified, although the particulars 
depend on the concrete subject matter.  The degree of codification especially differs 
from field to field.  The most important areas of direct implementation are the 
competition policy (Articles 81 et seq.), including antitrust law and merger control; 
the law on the European civil service; the conditions for awarding Community 
subsidies; and the restrictions on state aid (Articles 87 et seq.). 
II 
SOURCES OF THE LAW ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
European administrative procedure law is built on two pillars: written law, in the 
form of primary and secondary law; and judge-made law created by the European 
Courts. 
A. Written Law 
Some principles of administrative procedure can be found in primary Treaty law.  
Article 253 contains the duty to give reasons.  Regarding the control of state aid, 
Article 88 (2) provides the right to be heard.  Finally, Article 287 imposes the duty to 
observe rules of professional secrecy and to respect the confidentiality of information 
given to European officials by companies as well as by natural persons. 
Other administrative procedure principles are stated in rather detailed written 
sources of secondary law for competition policy,8 for the control of national 
subsidies,9 and for the regulation of the Community’s own civil service.10  In addition,  
rights of defense—originally, unwritten principles developed by the Court—are now 
at least partially protected in secondary legislation.11   
                                                          
 7. Case C-120/97, Upjohn Ltd. v. The Licensing Auth. established by the Medicines Act 1968, 1999 
E.C.R. I-223, para. 32; Case C-228/98, Charalampos Dounias v. Ypourgos Oikonomikon, 2000 E.C.R. I-577, 
para. 58. 
 8. Rules for the administrative implementation of the antitrust provisions of Art. 81 and 82 EC can be 
found in Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O. J. (L 1) 1 (formerly Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 O. J. (P 13) 
204) as well as in the Commission Regulation 773/2004, Relating to the Conduct of Proceedings by the 
Commission, 2004 O. J. (L 123) 18. Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O. J. (L 24) 1 (formerly Council 
Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O. J. (L 395) 1), regulates the control of concentrations between undertakings and is 
supplemented by the Commission Regulation 802/2004, 2004 O. J. (L 133) 1. 
 9. The detailed rules for the application of Art. 88 EC can be found in Council Regulation 659/99, 1999 
O. J. (L 83) 1. 
 10. The staff regulations for officials and the conditions of employment of other servants of the European 
Communities are laid down in Council Regulation 259/68, 1968 O. J. (L 56) 1. 
 11. Regarding the right to be heard the former Commission Regulation 2842/98 on the hearing of parties 
in cartel matters has to be mentioned. Equally the new Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of 
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Yet secondary law is generally limited to specific areas of Community 
competence and does not broadly cover all types of Community administrative action. 
Even in the face of codification, unwritten law continues to play an important role.   
B. Unwritten Law and Judge-Made Law 
Many unwritten principles shape European administrative law.  On the one hand, 
the important role of unwritten sources is due to the specific nature of Community 
law.  The Treaty establishing the European Community, almost like a traité cadre, 
only set leading goals and principles and left the gap-filling to secondary legislation 
and, if necessary, to the jurisdiction of the Court.  On the other hand, judge-made law 
at the Community level is typical of administrative law, which at its origin was shaped 
primarily by judgesin particular, the French Conseil d´Etat.  Not very long ago, 
codes of administrative procedure were first drafted and promulgated to serve as 
written sources of administrative law in the Member States.  The administrative law of 
the Community shows similar features, although it rightly claims to be a new, 
independent legal order of its own. 
The European Court has come a long way since the famous Algera case12 in 
developing general principles of administrative law13 and procedure, especially those 
principles regarding rights of defense. 
The European Courts rely on a number of sources for jurisprudence on 
administrative procedure.  First, they resort to the common administrative provisions 
of the Member States.  Second, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, proclaimed at Nice on December 7, 2000,14 gives some direction on 
administrative principles.  For example, Article 41 of the Charter provides for the 
right to good administration: every person has the right to have his or her affairs 
handled impartially, fairly, and within a reasonable time.  This includes the right of 
every person to be heard before the Community takes any individual measure that 
would adversely affect him or her; the right of access to files, while respecting the 
legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy; and the 
duty of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.  Although the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights is still a non-binding document, it can, like the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),15 indicate general principles common to the 
different legal traditions of the Member States.  In fact, the Court of First Instance has 
already referred to the right to good administration in a case before it.   
Since the present action is directed against a measure rejecting a complaint, it must be 
emphasised at the outset that the diligent and impartial treatment of a complaint is associated 
with the right to sound administration which is one of the general principles that are observed 
                                                                                                                                                         
Articles 81 and 82 EC, that came into force in May 2004, deals in its Article 27 with the right to be heard, the 
right to have access to the Commission’s files and the protection of business secrets. Article 28 of this 
regulation demands professional secrecy from the Commission’s and Member States officials. 
 12. Cases 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57, Dineke Algera et al. v. Common Assembly,  E.C.R. 39 (1957). 
 13. See JÜRGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 59 (1992); 1 EUROPÄISCHES 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 57; 1 DROIT ADMINISTRATIF EUROPÉEN 69. 
 14. 2000 O. J. (C 364) 1. 
 15. For the relevance of the ECHR for EC law see, e.g., Case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v. 
Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-729, para. 59. 
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in a State governed by the rule of law and are common to the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States.  Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
proclaimed at Nice on 7 December 2000 . . . confirms that every person has the right to have 
his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions 
and bodies of the Union. 16 
III 
REVIEWABLE ACTS 
The stage at which administrative decisionmaking is open to judicial review 
deserves a closer look.  Only an act that produces discernible legal effectsthat 
appears to produce a change in someone’s rights and obligationscan be subject to 
judicial review.  Non-binding recommendations or opinions are excluded from 
review.  In three different types of borderline casespreparatory acts, intermediate 
decisions, and the administrative decision to initiate litigationthe legal effects of 
administrative acts are not immediately apparent. 
A. Preparatory Acts 
The Court will not review merely preparatory acts, such as the Commission’s 
decision to initiate competition proceedings or the statement of objections in a cartel 
case.  In IBM v. Commission,17 the Court refused to review the initiation of a 
proceeding and the statement of objections because these decisions did not produce 
direct legal consequences.  The Court noted 
[a] Statement of objections does not compel the undertakings concerned to alter or reconsider 
its marketing practices. . . . Whilst a statement of objections may have the effect of showing 
the undertaking in question is incurring a real risk of being fined by the Commission, that is 
merely a consequence of fact, and not a legal consequence.18 
The Court further argued that the review of such a decision would 
make it necessary for the Court to arrive at a decision on questions on which the Commission 
has not yet had an opportunity to state its position and would as a result anticipate the 
arguments on the substance of the case, confusing different procedural stages both 
administrative and judicial.19 
Such a decision would therefore be incompatible with the division of powers that 
exists between the Commission and the Court.20 
B. Intermediate Decisions 
In a proceeding consisting of several stages, the Commission may make 
intermediate decisions on matters separate from the final determination, which 
represents a definitive position and thus produces legal consequences.  One example 
of such an intermediate decision is a request for information during a cartel procedure.  
                                                          
 16. Case T-54/99, max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-313, para. 
48. 
 17. Case 60/81, Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Comm’n, 1981 E.C.R. 2639. 
 18. Id. at para. 19. 
 19. Id. at para. 20. 
 20. Id. 
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The right to have this decision reviewed by the Court of Justice is set down in Article 
18(3) of Regulation 1/200321 on anti-competitive agreements among firms. 
Another example of a reviewable intermediate decision is any decision concerning 
the transmission of a company’s documents to a third party.  In AKZO v. 
Commission,22 the Court considered the Commission’s decision to transmit certain 
documents to third parties as definitive in nature and independent from any final 
decision.  According to the ECJ, the opportunity to bring an action against the final 
decision would not provide the company with an adequate degree of protection since 
it would not prevent the irreversible consequences that would result from the 
potentially illegal decision. 
In sum, whenever a decision carries the risk of irreversibly infringing a party’s 
rights of defense, a separate action for annulment is possible. 
C. Commencement of Legal Proceedings 
The issue of legal effects and reviewability also arises with respect to an 
administration’s decision to commence litigation.  In Philip Morris and Others23, 
recently decided by the Court of First Instance, several American cigarette 
manufacturers challenged the Commission’s decision to sue certain companies in 
United States district court for their alleged involvement in a cigarette smuggling ring.  
According to the Commission, the cigarettes were smuggled into and distributed 
within the European Community.  The Community was seeking compensation for the 
loss resulting from the smuggling, consisting mainly of lost customs duties and value 
added tax (VAT)—which would have been paid on legal imports—as well as 
injunctions prohibiting the alleged activities in the future.24 
The tobacco companies were unable to obtain review in the Court of First 
Instance.  The Court dismissed the actions because the challenged act had, in its view, 
no legal effects: 
The commencement of legal proceedings is not without legal effects, but those effects 
concern principally the procedure before the court seized of the case.  The commencement of 
proceedings constitutes an indispensable step for the purpose of obtaining a binding 
judgment but does not per se determine definitively the obligations of the parties to the case.  
That determination can result only from the judgment of the court.  The decision to 
commence legal proceedings does not, therefore, in itself alter the legal position in 
question. . . .  When it decides to commence proceedings, the Commission does not intend 
(itself) to change the legal position in question, but merely opens a procedure whose purpose 
is to achieve a change in that position through a judgment.  
This reasoning holds true not only for actions brought by an institution before the Court 
of Justice, but also for proceedings it may commence before national courts.  In both cases, it 
is not the institution that brings the case before the Community or national court, but only 
that court which, by the decision it is called upon to give, can alter the legal position 
underlying the case and determine definitively the rights and obligations of the parties. 25 
                                                          
 21. Formerly Article 11 (5) of Regulation 17/62. 
 22. Case 53/85, AKZO Chemie et al. v. Comm’n,, 1986 E.C.R. 1965, para. 20. 
 23. Cases T-377/00, T-379/00, T-380/00, T-260/01 and T-272/01, Philip Morris International et al. v. 
Comm’n 2003 E.C.R. II-1. 
 24. Id. at para. 3. 
 25. Id. paras. 79 & 80. 
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Given the consequences for the defendants of any legal action, the Court should 
have taken a different position.  By dismissing this action, the Court lost the 
opportunity to decide whether the Commission’s intiating the lawsuit complied with 
EC law.  In view of the extraordinary character of a lawsuit in third-country courts, 
and the possible impact on the European Union’s foreign policies, the question of the 
legality of the prosecutorial decision deserved judicial review.  Because the U.S. 
courts will not decide the issue of the Commission’s power, the Commission will 




Different legal acts have different procedural requirements.  The procedural 
requirements of an administrative action include adherence to certain provisions on 
form, consultation of an advisory body, adequate reasoning, and publication or 
notification of an act.26  Foremost among the procedural requirements subject to 
judicial review in the European Courts are the so-called rights of defense.  In the 
majority of legal proceedings challenging administrative acts, the complainant claims 
that his rights of defense were violated by the administration. 
A. Rights of Defense 
The rights of defense include the right to be heard (including the right of access to 
the Commission’s files), the duty to give reasons, the reasonable duration of the 
proceedings, the confidentiality of attorney-client correspondence, and the privilege 
against self-incrimination.27 
1. Right to Be Heard 
The most important principle of administrative procedure is probably the right to 
be heard, which is closely related to the concept of fair and just proceedings.28  The 
Court of Justice has acknowledged “the general principle that when any administrative 
body adopts a measure which is liable gravely to prejudice the interests of an 
individual it is bound to put him in a position to express his point of view.”29 
                                                          
 26. See H. G. SCHERMERS/D. F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION , § 758 
et seq. (6th ed. 2001) 
 27. See Case 374/87, Orkem SA v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 3283, para. 35: “Thus, the Commission may not 
compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence 
of an infringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove.” 
 28. Already in 1963 the ECJ had pointed out that, 
 [a]ccording to a generally accepted principle of administrative law in force in the Member States . . . , 
the administrations . . . must allow their servants the opportunity of replying to allegations before any 
disciplinary decision is taken concerning them. This rule, which meets the requirements of sound 
justice and good administration, must be followed by Community institutions. 
Case 32/62, Maurice Alvis v. Council, 1963 E.C.R. 109, 123.  See generally M. Waline, Le principe “Audi 
alteram partem”, in LE CONSEIL D’ETAT DU GRAND-DUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG: LIVRE JUBILAIRE 495 (1957). 
 29. Case 121/76, Moli v. Comm’n, 1977 E.C.R. 1971, 1979. 
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The leading case concerning the right to be heard is Transocean Marine Paint 
Association v. Commission.30  In Transocean, the Commission subjected the extension 
of an exemption from the prohibition of cartels under Article 85 (3) of the EEC 
Treaty, now Article 81 (3) of the Treaty, to a new set of conditions.  The paint 
manufacturers who were parties to the exempted manufacture and marketing 
agreement were required to supply the Commission with information about any links 
between members of the Association and any other company in the paint sector or any 
Association members’ financial participation in such outside companies.  The 
members of the Association appealed to the Court of Justice, claiming the 
Commission had violated certain provisions of an antitrust regulation31 by imposing 
the above-mentioned new conditions upon the Association without a hearing on its 
views.  Advocate General Warner used the opportunity, which came shortly after the 
United Kingdom had joined the EEC in 1973, to introduce certain principles of 
English law into European Community law.  He explained that in English law the 
right to be heard is a so-called “rule of natural law,” which requires that a party be 
heard even if there is no written obligation.32  Warner demonstrated in his opinion that 
the concept of audi alteram partem33 is a general principle recognized in the legal 
orders of all Member States and that it should, therefore, also govern administrative 
proceedings in the European Community.34  The Court accepted the opinion and held 
that the relevant regulation applied: 
The general rule is that a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a decision taken 
by a public authority must be given the opportunity to make his point of view known.  This 
rule requires that an undertaking be clearly informed, in good time, of the essence of 
conditions to which the Commission intends to subject an exemption and it must have the 
opportunity to submit its observations to the Commission.  This is especially so in the case of 
conditions which, as in this case, impose considerable obligations having far-reaching 
effects.35 
The right to be heard inescapably also includes the right of access to the 
Commission’s files.  For an individual or undertaking to express its views effectively, 
it must also be able to respond to the documents used by the administration in support 
of the allegation of misconduct.36 
                                                          
 30. Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass’n v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 1063. 
 31. Commision Regulation 99/63/EEC, 1963 O.J. (P 127) 2268 on the hearings provided for in Article 19 
(1) and (2) of Council Regulation 17/62. 
 32. Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass’n v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 1083, 1090. 
 33. Advocate General Warner’s argument proves among other things the importance of Roman law ideas 
and Latin expressions within the multilingual juristic community of the ECJ. From a doctrinal point of view, 
their meaning is not totally precise but nonetheless can serve as a platform for a basic level of common 
understanding. Another example of reference to a Latin formula (patere legem quam fecisti) is to be found in 
the opinion of Warner, Case 81/72, Comm’n v. Council, 1973 E.C.R. 587, 594 et seq. 
 34. Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass’n v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 1083, 1090 et seq. 
 35. Id. at 1081, para. 15. 
 36. See, e.g., Case 322/81, N.V. Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R.  
3461, para. 7. 
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2. Duty to Give Reasons 
The obligation to give reasons serves the aim of effective legal protection by 
enabling courts to carefully review administrative decisions.  The European Courts 
have consistently held 
[t]hat the statement of grounds required by Article 190 of the EEC Treaty (now Article 253 
EC) must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the 
Community authority which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to make the 
persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thus enable them to defend their 
rights and the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.37 
The extent of this duty depends on the circumstances of each individual case.  When 
assessing whether the administration’s statement of reasons meets the requirements, 
the Court must consider factors such as the content of the measure, the nature of the 
reasons given, and the interest of the parties in obtaining explanations.38  According to 
the European Court of Justice, the administration’s reasoning does not have to address 
all the relevant facts and points of law, since judging whether the statement of reasons 
meets the requirements involves not only the administration’s wording but also the 
context and all the legal rules governing the matter in question.39 
3. Principle of a Reasonable Duration of the Proceedings 
A general principle of Community law is that the administration must adopt 
decisions within a reasonable time.40  According to the European Courts, it is 
impossible to determine a precise, maximum limit in the abstract.  The reasonableness 
of a period must instead be appraised in the light of the specific circumstances of each 
case, taking into account context, complexity, the importance of the case to the parties 
involved, and the conduct of both the person concerned and the authorities.41 
4. Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Correspondence 
The principle of privileged attorney-client correspondence was adopted by the 
Court in AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission.42  This principle, familiar to lawyers 
                                                          
 37. Case 350/88, Société Francaise des Biscuits Delacre SA et al. v. Comm’n, 1990 E.C.R. I-395, para. 15.  
As an example of the latest jurisprudence see Case C-113/00, Spain v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. I-7601, para. 47; 
Cases T-141/99, T-142/99, T-150/99 and T-151/99, Vela Srl and Tecnagrind SL v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-
4547, para. 168; Case T-199/99, Sgaravatti Mediterranea Srl v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2289, para. 100. 
 38. Case C-113/00, Spain v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. I-7601, para. 47 et seq; Cases T-141/99, T-142/99, T-
150/99 and T-151/99, Vela Srl and Tecnagrind SL v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4547, para. 169; Case T-199/99, 
Sgaravatti Mediterranea Srl v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2289, para. 100. 
 39. Case C-17/99, France v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. I-2481, para. 36; Case C-310/99 Italy v. Comm’n, 
2002 E.C.R. I-2289, para. 48; Case T-15/99, Brugg Rohrsysteme GmbH v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. I-2289, para. 
203; Cases T-141/99, T-142/99, T-150/99, T-151/99, Vela Srl and Tecnagrind SL v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-
4547, para. 170. 
 40. Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) et al. v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. I-8375, para. 164 et seq.; Cases T-
213/95 and T-18/96 Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) et al. v. Comm’n, 1997 II-1739, para. 56.  For the 
reasonable duration of judicial proceedings, see Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Comm’n, 1998 
E.C.R. I-8417, para. 26 et seq. 
 41. Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) et al. v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. I-8375, para. 187, 192; Cases T-
213/95 and T-18/96, Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) et al. v. Comm’n, 1997 II-1739, para. 57. 
 42. Case 155/79, AM and S Europe Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575. 
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in common law states,43 is not developed to the same extent in continental European 
legal orders—a circumstance that created a notable challenge for the Court.  In AM & 
S Europe Limited, the Court had to decide on the scope of the Commission’s 
investigative powers in antitrust proceedings.  During an investigation in 1979 into an 
alleged cartel on zinc producers, AM & S Europe Ltd. refused to produce certain 
documents, including correspondence and records of legal consultations with 
independent and in-house lawyers.  AM & S claimed that these documents were 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.44 In contrast, the Commission took the view 
that its investigative powers in antitrust procedures included an unlimited right to 
check any document and file and to make a determination as to significance.  In its 
view, this right extended to correspondence and records of legal consultations with 
independent and in-house lawyers.  Although the Court of Justice acknowledged that 
the standard of protection differs among the Member States, it concluded that 
European Community law contains a general principle of privileged correspondence 
between lawyers and clients, at least for correspondence with independent, as opposed 
to in-house, lawyers: 
Apart from these differences, however, there are to be found in the national laws of the 
Member States common criteria inasmuch as those laws protect, in similar circumstances, the 
confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client provided that, on the 
one hand, such communications are made for the purposes and in the interests of the client’s 
rights of defence and, on the other hand, they emanate from independent lawyers, that is to 
say, lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment.45 
In the AM & S judgment, the Court recognized the individual right of 
confidentiality of correspondence between lawyer and client, and defined its exact 
shape through a synthesis of common law concepts and continental law ideas. 
B. Relevance of Procedural Guarantees 
1. Importance of Procedural Guarantees for Discretionary Decisions 
The Courts normally grant European administrative authorities broad 
discretionary powers.  Since they do not want to substitute the administrative 
judgment with their own, they only check that the procedural rules have been 
observed, that the facts have been accurately stated, and that there has been no 
manifest error of assessment or a misuse of power. 
Because discretionary decisions are not fully reviewable, the Courts attach great 
importance to compliance with the formal rules of procedure.  This point was 
particularly emphasized in Technische Universität München v. Commission.46  The 
Court reviewed a decision of the Commission regarding the customs duty imposed on 
an electron microscope imported from Japan.  As it had in previous cases, the Court of 
                                                          
 43. For the law of the United Kingdom as far as legal confidence of lawyers’ correspondence is concerned, 
see House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities Competition Practice (H.M.S.O., 
London: February 1982) p. XII passim. 
 44. For the history of this case, see H. W. KREIS, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 157 (B.E. Hawk ed., 1983). 
 45. Case 155/79, AM and S Europe Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, para. 21. 
 46. Case C-269/90, Technische Universität v. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte, 1991 E.C.R. I-5469, para. 13 
et seq. 
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Justice noted that if an administrative procedure requires complex technical 
evaluations, the Commission must have a power of discretion.47  But in Technische 
Universität München, the Court further ruled that only if the required procedural steps 
had been observed could it find that the Commission had properly used its 
discretionary powers.  According to the Court, the procedural guarantees in this sense 
included rules on investigation, the right to be heard, and the duty to give reasons for 
the administrative action.  The Court explained: 
It must be stated first of all that, since an administrative procedure entailing complex 
technical evaluations is involved, the Commission must have a power of appraisal in order to 
be able to fulfil its tasks.  However, where the Community institutions have such a power of 
appraisal, respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative 
procedures is of even more fundamental importance.  Those guarantees include, in particular, 
the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant 
aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned to make his views known 
and to have an adequately reasoned decision.  Only in this way can the Court verify whether 
the factual and legal elements upon which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends 
were present.48 
The importance of this case lies in its strict enforcement of procedural requirements in 
the administrative decisionmaking process.49  Discretion can be exercised properly 
only if the decisionmaking process is correct.  Professor Rodríguez Iglesias, former 
President of the European Court of Justice, has emphasized that this judgment reflects 
a more general tendency to extend judicial protection of individual rights.50  The 
European Courts have since confirmed these principles.51 
The reason for strict observance of the rules for administrative procedure is 
obvious, particularly in the field of highly complicated administrative decisions.  
Judges leave evaluation of the substance largely to the administration, which is 
thought to have special expertise on technical matters.52  To counterbalance 
administrative discretion, the Courts ensure the strict observance of procedural 
safeguards for the benefit of individuals, associations, or institutions affected by the 
administrative decision.  Today, allowing the administration discretionary powers 
                                                          
 47. Discretionary powers are delegated to the Commission by Directive 83/348 EEC under which 
scientific apparatuses benefit from customs duty exemptions when they are of “educational, cultural or 
scientific value.” 
 48. Case C-269/90, Technische Universität v. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte, 1991 E.C.R. I-5469, para. 13 
et seq. 
 49. J. SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 143 (1992). 
 50. G. C. RODRÍGUEZ IGLESIAS, EUROPARECHT (1992). 
 51. See, e.g., Case C-294/90, British Aerospace et al. v. Comm’n, 1992 E.C.R. I-493.  The Court linked 
the lawfulness of a decision, in this instance the recovery of a subsidy, to guarantees of administrative 
procedure. The case British Aerospace  underlines the Court’s interest in procedural control. The Court once 
again declared a decision of the Commission unlawful on procedural grounds, this time because certain 
procedural requirements stipulated in the Treaty—in Art. 87 and Art. 88 (2) EC—had not been met.  The 
discretionary powers exercised by the Community were derived directly from Treaty provisions, i.e. Art. 87 (1) 
EC. The procedural guarantees can be found in Art. 88 (2) EC, requiring a period of time to be granted to the 
subsidy-receiving parties to enable them to state their views. 
 52. Case 188/85, Fediol v. Comm’n, 1988 E.C.R. 4193, para. 40; J. SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1443 (1992); I. van Bael, Discretionary Powers of the Commission and Their Legal 
Control in Trade and Antitrust Matters, in DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF 
ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THEIR LIMITS UNDER THE EEC TREATY 165, 173 (J. Schwarze ed., 1988). 
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appears permissible only if discretion is exercised in strict observance of procedural 
guarantees. 
2. The Importance of Procedural Guarantees for the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights 
Procedural guarantees are also important for the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms.53  In Stanley Adams v. Commission, the Court developed its analysis on 
procedural and fundamental rights.54  The case tested the Commission’s duty to 
protect the confidentiality of information given by companies and natural persons.  
Stanley Adams had informed the Commission of certain anti-competitive practices of 
his former employer, Hoffmann-La Roche.  This information led the Commission to 
impose a fine on the Swiss company for the abuse of its dominant position in the 
market for bulk vitamins.55  In the course of the antitrust proceeding, the Commission 
disclosed documents that made it possible for Hoffmann-La Roche to identify Adams 
as the source of the information.  This led to his arrest, detention, and conviction in 
Switzerland.  Adams brought an action under Article 230 and Article 288 of the 
Treaty56 against the Commission for damages.  He blamed the Commission for having 
disclosed confidential information and for not having warned him of the risk of his 
returning to Switzerland.  The Court held that Article 214 EEC Treaty (now Article 
287 of the Treaty), which lays down the obligation of the members and civil servants 
of Community institutions “not to disclose information of the kind covered by the 
obligation of professional secrecy, in particular information about companies, their 
business relations or their cost components,” contains a general principle that applies 
not only to confidential information gathered from companies, but also to information 
supplied by natural persons.57  The Court found that the Commission was bound by a 
duty of confidentiality toward Mr. Adams.  It left open the question whether the 
Commission’s handing over of the documents to Hoffmann-La Roche was sufficient 
to create liability for Mr. Adams’ misfortunes.  The Court concluded, however, that 
the Commission had had a duty to take every possible step to warn Adams of the 
measures that Hoffmann-La Roche was likely to take against him once they learned he 
was an informant.58  The Commission had failed to warn Mr. Adams, and it was found 
liable for the harm to Mr. Adams’ personal freedom and property interests. 
The Stanley Adams case illustrates an additional point: two or more procedural 
rights might sometimes come into conflict.  Hoffmann-La Roche’s right to be heard 
includes the right to obtain information about the factual data upon which the 
Commission’s decision was based.  Yet Hoffman-La Roche’s rights must be 
                                                          
 53. Art. 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for the right to good administration; see also 
supra nn. 12–16 and accompanying text. 
 54. Case 145/83, Stanley Adams v. Comm’n, 1985 E.C.R. 3539; see also Case 53/85, AKZO Chemie et al 
v. Comm’n, 1986 E.C.R. 1965. 
 55. See Decision 76/642/EEC, 1976 O. J. (L 223) 27.  This decision of the Commission was confirmed in 
all essential respects by the Court’s judgment of February 13, 1979, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Comm’n 
1979 E.C.R. 461. 
 56. Formerly Article 178 and Article 215 (2) EEC. 
 57. Case 145/83, Stanley Adams v. Comm’n, 1985 E.C.R. 3539, para. 34. 
 58. Id. at para. 42. 
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reconciled with the interest in efficient anti-trust procedure and the interests of those 
who provide the Commission with information in secrecy.59 
In UNECTEF v. Heylens,60 another landmark case in fundamental rights., the issue 
was whether the principle of the free movement of workers (Article 39 EC) rendered 
unlawful a national provision on access to the football trainer profession.  The 
provision allowed individuals without a national diploma or the equivalent to be 
denied access to the profession without explanation and without recourse to challenge  
the administrative decision refusing recognition.  The Court of Justice found this 
national law incompatible with the free movement of workers—a fundamental right 
under Community law.  The principle of effective legal protection of such rights was 
described by the Court as a “general principle of Community law [that] underlies the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and [that] has been enshrined 
in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.”61 
Moreover, the Court had this to say about the relationship between judicial review 
and the administration’s duty to give reasons: 
Effective judicial review, which must be able to cover the legality of the reasons for the 
contested decision, presupposes in general that the court to which the matter referred may 
require the competent authority to notify its reasons.  But where, as in this case, it is more 
particularly a question of securing the effective protection of a fundamental right conferred 
by the Treaty on Community workers, the latter must also be able to defend that right under 
the best possible conditions and have the possibility of deciding, with a full knowledge of the 
relevant facts, whether there is any point in their applying to the courts.  Consequently, in 
such circumstances the competent national authority is under a duty to inform them of the 
reason on which its refusal is based, either in the decision itself or in a subsequent 
communication made at their request.62 
The protection of fundamental, constitutional rights is thus inextricably linked to 
correct administrative procedure. 
C. Legal Consequences of Procedural Defects 
Under Article 230 of the Treaty, only the “infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement” is grounds for annulment.  However, procedural requirements can hardly 
be classified as essential or unessential: what is meant, instead, is the essential or 
unessential infringement of the same provision.63  Whether an infringement is 
                                                          
 59. J. Schwarze, The Administrative Law of the Community and the Protection of Human Rights, 
1996 COMMON MKT. L. 401. 
 60. Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4097. 
 61. Id. at para. 14. 
 62. Id. at para. 15; see also Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, para. 13.  In this 
case, the ECJ imposed a similar requirement of judicial review of an administrative determination that a female 
officer could not serve in the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 
 63. C. Gaitanides in VERTRAG ÜBER DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION UND VERTRAG ZUR GRÜNDUNG DER 
EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT Art. 230, para. 122 (H. Von der Groeben & J. Schwarze eds., 6th ed. 2004); 
W. Cremer, in KOMMENTAR ZU EU-VERTRAG UND EG-VERTRAG, Art. 230, para. 71 (C. Callies & M. Ruffert 
eds., 2d ed., 2002); P. CRAIG & G. DE BÚRCA, EU LAW 533 (3d ed., 2002); Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v. 
Comm’n [1980] E.C.R. 2229, para 26; see also Opinion of Advocate General J.-P. Warner, id. at 2290.  For a 
more recent opinion, see Opinion of Advocate General D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Case C-204/00 Aalborg 
Portland A/S v. Comm’n 2004 E.C.R. II, paras. 29-30 (not yet published). 
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essential or unessential depends on the impact that failure to respect the requirements 
has on the ultimate administrative outcome64 or on individual rights.65 
The standard of proof for showing an essential infringement is fairly low.  In a 
recent staff case, the Court of First Instance pointed out that the right to be heard is 
infringed if “it cannot be reasonably precluded that that irregularity could have had a 
particular impact on the content of that act.”66  In the Court’s view, the failure to 
engage in a preliminary consultation would be shown to have no impact on the result 
only if the administration had no discretion when adopting the final act.67  Since 
European authorities are normally granted discretionary powers, the infringement of 
the right to a hearing would, according to this court, virtually always lead to an 
annulment.  A similar approach is found in Schneider Electric v. Commission.68  The 
Court of First Instance annulled the Commission’s decision, stating that, had a proper 
hearing taken place, the companies would have been able to propose alternative 
remedies to the competition problems.  The Commission might then have 
reconsidered its position or provided further evidence in support of its decision.69   
In recent years, the standard for showing an essential infringement of the right of 
access to the authorities’ files has been lowered even further.  It is not necessary for 
the reviewing court to show that the administrative decision would have been 
different, but only that the documents to which access had been denied could have 
been used in preparing the defense.70  However, if the Commission’s decision was 
based on documents other than those to which access had been denied, the European 
Courts have refused to annul the decision.71  As for the duty to give reasons, the 
Courts are fairly strict.  They regularly annul decisions whenever this duty is 
breached, without any further discussion of whether the infringement is essential.72 
                                                          
 64. Case C-301/87, France v. Comm’n, 1990 E.C.R. I-307, para. 31; H. Krück, supra note 63, at Art. 173 
para. 79; W. Cremer, supra note 63, at Art. 230 para. 73; J. Schwarze, in EU-Kommentar, Art. 230 para. 61 (J. 
Schwarze, ed.) 
 65. D. Booß, supra note 6, at Art. 230, para. 103; M. Burgi, in HANDBUCH DES RECHTSSCHUTZES IN DER 
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION § 7 para. 98 (H.-W. Rengeling, A. Middeke, & M. Gellermann eds., 2d ed., 2003). 
 66. Case T-237/00, Patrick Reynolds v. European Parliament, 2002 E.C.R. II-163, para. 112. 
 67. Id. at para. 113. 
 68. Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071. 
 69. Id. at para. 456. 
 70. Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV et al. v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. I-8375, para. 318; Case C-51/92 P, Hercules 
Chemicals NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-4235, para. 81; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-
4381, para. 89. 
 71. Case 234/84, Belgium v. Comm’n, 1986 E.C.R. 2263, para. 30; Case T-205/99 Hyper Srl v. Comm’n, 
2002 E.C.R. II-3141, para. 60. 
 72. Case T-323/99, Industrie Navali Meccaniche Affini SpA (INMA) et al. v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-
545, para. 106 et seq.; Case T-206/99, Métropole télévision SA v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-1057, para. 53 et 
seq.; Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale et al. v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-
435, para. 420; Case T-251/00, Lagardère SCA  et al. v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4825, para. 159 et seq.; Case 
T-388/00, Institut für Lernsysteme GmbH v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and 
Designs) (OHIM), 2002 E.C.R. II-4301, para. 58. 
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V 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SCOPE OF REVIEW 
 OF COMMISSION COMPETITION DETERMINATIONS 
Two significant recent developments in the case law of the European Court of 
Justice have been not procedural mistakes themselves, but judicial review of the use 
of administrative discretion and the standards that should be observed in imposing 
administrative sanctions.73 
A. Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion:  Merger 
Control Decisions 
In 2002, in Airtours,74 Schneider Electric,75 and Tetra Laval,76 the Court of First 
Instance for the first time annulled Commission determinations in the area of merger 
control.  The Court’s thorough and detailed analysis of all the facts and legal 
arguments used in the Commission’s decisions, despite the complexity of the issue,  
was especially remarkable because, usually, an issue’s high complexity results in 
significant administrative discretion (a large marge d’appreciation) and reduced 
judicial review. 
Tetra Laval and Schneider were also notable as the first merger control cases to be 
decided under the Court of First Instance’s new expedited procedure.77  Thanks to 
these “fast-track” procedural provisions, in both cases a final judicial decision was 
available around one year after the Commission’s decision to deny merger approval. 
In Airtours, the Court of First Instance blamed the Commission for not having 
satisfactorily proven that the merger would lead to a collective dominant position on 
the British foreign package holiday market: 
In the light of all of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Decision, far from basing its 
prospective analysis on cogent evidence, is vitiated by a series of errors of assessment as to 
factors fundamental to any assessment of whether a collective dominant position might be 
created.  It follows that the Commission prohibited the transaction without having proved to 
the requisite legal standard that the concentration would give rise to a collective dominant 
position of the three major tour operators, of such a kind as significantly to impede effective 
competition in the relevant market.78 
Likewise, in Schneider Electric, the Court of First Instance concluded that the 
Commission had failed to prove that the merger created or strengthened a dominant 
position resulting in the significant impediment of effective competition in a 
substantial part of common market.79  The Court found grave errors, omissions, and 
                                                          
 73. Both developments concern the ground of review of illegality (“Infringement of the Treaty or of any 
rule of law relating to its application,” Art. 230 (2) EC). Under this head of review, administrative bodies have 
to observe primary and secondary law as well as general principles of law such as the fundamental rights, 
equality, the principle of proportionality, and legal certainty. 
 74. Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2585. 
 75. Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071. 
 76. Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4381. 
 77. Art. 76a of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance came into force on February 1, 2001; 
see 2000 O. J. (L 322) 4. 
 78. Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2585, para. 294. 
 79. This is the legal standard under Article 2 (3) Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 392) 1. 
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inconsistencies in the Commission’s analysis.80  These shortcomings were “such as to 
deprive of probative value the economic assessment of the impact of the concentration 
which forms the basis for the contested declaration of incompatibility.”81 
In Tetra Laval, the Court of First Instance similarly annulled the Commission’s 
decision because it had not proven that the modified merger would give rise to 
significant anti-competitive conglomerate effects.  
In particular, [the decision] does not establish to the requisite legal standard that any 
dominant position would be created on one of the various relevant PET packaging equipment 
markets and that Tetra’s current position on the aseptic carton markets would be 
strengthened.  It must therefore be concluded that the Commission committed a manifest 
error of assessment in prohibiting the modified merger on the basis of the evidence relied on 
in the contested decision relating to the foreseen conglomerate effect. 82 
Although the European Courts have traditionally granted broad discretionary 
powers to the administration, especially when complex economic analysis is 
involved,83 today, the Court of First Instance is willing to review the Commission’s 
reasoning in great detail.84 
This change of legal practice in the merger control area—which the economic 
adviser of Airtours went so far as to call a “watershed in E.U. merger policy” and a 
“wake-up call” for the Commission85—in combination with the application of the 
new, expedited “fast-track” procedure, represents an important improvement of 
judicial review. 
The Court of First Instance obviously felt it necessary to counterbalance the 
substantial power the Commission exercises in economic matters, especially given 
that the global competitiveness of European industry is at stake.  The case law tracks a 
general trend in modern administrative law.  As comparative analyses of national 
administrative law show, it is extremely difficult to define in abstract terms the 
parameters within which administrations should be allowed to evaluate economic 
facts and consequences without any judicial interference.86  This issue is now 
surfacing at the Community level.  The division of powers between the Courts and the 
administration has not been clearly identified.  The Courts instead use a flexible 
                                                          
 80. Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071, para. 404. 
 81. Id. at para. 411. 
 82. Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4381,  para. 336. 
 83. For example, the Court noted in one case,  
In this respect, however, the basic provisions of the Regulation, in particular Article 2 thereof, confer 
on the Commission a certain discretion, especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature. 
Consequently, review by the Community judicature of the exercise of that discretion, which is 
essential for defining the rules on concentrations, must take account of the discretionary margin 
implicit in the provisions of an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations. 
Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France et al. v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. II-1375, para. 223. 
 84. C. D. Ehlermann and S. B. Völcker, Editorial, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT  
(2003). 
 85. A. Overd, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 375, 377 (2002). 
 86. For the flexible scope of judicial review in French administrative law, see G. VEDEL AND P. 
DELVOLVÉ, 2 DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 318 (12th ed., 1992).  For German and French administrative law see J. 
SCHWARZE, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 241, 249 (2000).  For British administrative law 
see H. WOOLF AND J. JOWELL, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION paras 6-004 (5th ed., 1995).  
For American administrative law see J. L. MASHAW, R. A. MERRILL, AND P. M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 748 (4th ed., 2000). 
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judicial review strategy that depends on the necessities of the particular case to limit 
or allow economic administrative power. 
B. Future Directions in Judicial Review of Administrative Sanctions 
Finally, what is the role for criminal law standards and principles in administrative 
decisionmaking?  Should the more protective standards and principles of criminal law 
be applied when administrative measures have a significant impact on individual 
rights, such as in the case of sanctions? 
Sanctions are a major policy instrument in the European Community.  They are 
primarily fines, such as those used in antitrust law87 and merger control.88  Other kinds 
of sanctions, especially common in the agricultural sector,89 are the recovery of 
wrongfully paid benefits, sometimes combined with an additional fee, the temporary 
withdrawal of the approval or recognition necessary for participation in a Community 
aid scheme, or the forfeiture of a security or deposit. 
Sanctions can serve various purposes: restitution, prevention, and retribution.  
Restitution gives reparations for the damages caused.  Prevention focuses on the 
deterrent effect of sanctions.  Finally, retribution seeks revenge for the committed tort.  
While the recovery of benefits merely serves restitutionary purposes, instruments like 
fines and additional fees serve preventive and retributive functions as well. 
Since both prevention and retribution are typical of criminal penalties,90 the 
question is whether criminal law and criminal procedure standards, such as nulla 
poena sine culpa and nullum crimen sine lege, apply to such sanctions.  The nulla 
poena sine culpa principle states that no one may be penalized without guilt.  Nullum 
crimen sine lege means that the elements of an offence and its legal consequences 
must have been clearly defined by law before the deed in question was committed.  
Both maxims are accepted in most of the Member States’ legal systems.  Both can 
also be found in the European Convention on Human Rightsthe principle of fault in 
Article 6 (2), and the nullum crimen sine lege principle in Article 7.  The nullum 
crimen sine lege principle is recognized as well in Article 49 (1) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Notwithstanding the preventive and retributive character of sanctions, the 
European Courts regularly classify them as administrative instruments and thus deny 
the applicability of criminal law principles.91  According to the European Court of 
                                                          
 87. Article 23 of Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O. J. (L 1) 1 (formerly Article 15 of Council Regulation 
17/62, 1962 O. J.  (P 13) 204). 
 88. Article 14 of Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O. J. (L 24) 1 (formerly Article 14 of Council 
Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O. J.  (L 395) 1). 
 89. The Court has repeatedly recognized the Community’s power to impose penalties necessary for the 
effective application of the rules in the sphere of the common agricultural policy based on Art. 34 (2) and Art. 
37 (3) EC. See Case C-240/90, Germany v. Comm’n, 1992 E.C.R. I-5383, para. 11. 
 90. See H.-H. JESCHECK AND T. WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS 3, 68 (4th ed., 1988). 
 91. Case 137/85, Maizena GmbH et al. v. Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung (BALM), 
1987 E.C.R. 4587, para. 13; Case C-240/90, Germany v. Comm’n, 1992 E.C.R. I-5383, para. 25; Case C-
210/00, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 2002 E.C.R. I-
6453, para. 43. An exception to this approach are the ECJ judgments concerning the Commission’s 
Polypropylene Decision. The Court stated that the criminal law principle of the presumption of innocence 
applies to the procedures that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments.  Case C-
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Justice, sanctions are necessary for good administration and the effective 
implementation of Community law.92 
This approach is illustrated by the Court of Justice’s decision in Käserei 
Champignon.93  At issue was a regulation that allows sanctions to be imposed without 
any showing of fault.  A cheese dairy had applied for and received an export refund 
for a cheese spread manufactured by a third party.  An inspection revealed that the 
goods contained vegetable fat and therefore ought to have been classified under a 
different Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Goods List Number than the one given 
in the refund application.  The German Customs and Excise Office demanded the 
restitution of the subsidy as well as the payment of a penalty.94  There was no showing 
of subjective fault, and the only exception to the penalty under the regulation was in 
cases involving force majeure.  The Court of Justice found the provision in question to 
be valid.  Contrary to the view of the plaintiff, the Court held that the sanction could 
not be said to be of a criminal nature; hence the principle of nulla poena sine culpa 
did not apply.95 
At least some sanctions should be treated as criminal rather than administrative for 
a number of reasons.  First, the deterrent and retributive impact of certain sanctions is 
such that they should be reviewed under the strict standards of criminal law.  Under  
Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 (formerly Article 15 of Regulation 17/62), breaches 
of the competition rules laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty can be 
penalized with fines up to ten percent of the firm’s turnover in the preceding business 
year.96  Regulation 1/2003 expressly says these fines are not sanctions “of a criminal 
law nature.”97  While the fines were relatively low during the initial phase of the 
European Community, they have continuously increased since the Pioneer decision.98  
In Pioneer, the Court of Justice explicitly granted the Commission the right to raise 
the level of the fines for reasons of deterrence.99  In 1998, the Commission made a 
substantive change to the practice of imposing fines by introducing its “Guidelines on 
                                                                                                                                                         
199/92 P, Hüls AG v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-4287,  para. 150; Case C-235/92, Montecatini SpA v. Comm’n, 
1999 E.C.R. I-4539, para. 176. In these judgments the Court referred to the following judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Öztürk, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A); Lutz, 123 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). 
 92. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, para. 18; Case C-240/90, Germany 
v. Comm’n, 1992 E.C.R. I-5383, para. 25; Case C-210/00, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister GmbH & Co. KG 
v. Hauptzollamt  Hamburg-Jonas, 2002 E.C.R I-6453, paras. 33, 38. 
 93. Case C-210/00, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 
2002 E.C.R. I-6453. 
 94. Based on point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 11 (1) of Regulation 3665/87 (now Article 51 of 
Regulation 800/99). 
 95. Case C-210/00, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 
2002 E.C.R. I-6453, para. 38 et seq. According to the opinion of the Court the attacked provision only intends 
to combat the numerous irregularities which are committed in the context of agricultural aid and simply forms 
an integral part of the export refund system to which the applicant deliberately subjects himself. 
 96. The scope of possible fines for infringements of Art. 81 and Art. 82 EC remained mostly unchanged by 
the reform of Regulation 17/62. Article 23 of the new Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O. J. (L 1) 1 contains in 
large part the same provisions as Article 15 of Regulation 17/62. See also A. Weitbrecht, in EUROPÄISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 69 (2003). 
 97. See Article 23 (5) of Regulation 1/2003. 
 98. Case 80/256, Pioneer v. EC of December 14, 1979, 1980 O. J. (L 60) 21. 
 99. Cases 100-103/80, Musique Diffusion francaise et al. v. Comm’n (“Pioneer”), 1983 E.C.R. 1825,  
para. 109. 
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the method of setting fines,”100 which changed the calculation basis of the fines.101  
This led to a remarkable increase in the size of fines.  In 2001, the penalties in total 
amounted to 1.8 billion Euros. 
Regulation 1/2003 sets down a broad general framework for fines as well as rough 
criteria for the calculation of the fine, namely the gravity and the duration of the 
antitrust infringement.  Nonetheless, the continuously increasing level of the fines 
raises the question whether the explicit legal qualification of competition fines as not 
being “of a criminal law nature” is still valid.  It is questionable whether a simple 
change in administrative practice expressed in a Commission guideline is a legitimate 
basis for such significant monetary penalties.  Specific provisions for the assessment 
of punishment should be adopted in the law instead of left to administrative 
guidelines.102  If not as a consequence of the nullum crimen sine lege principle, at the 
very least this clarification should be introduced as the expression of sound legal 
policy. 
Second, the European Court of Human Rights has made clear in its jurisprudence 
that the applicability of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning criminal law (Articles 6 and 7) does not depend on the formal 
classification of sanctions under national law.  According to the European Court of 
Human Rights, what is relevant is the legislator’s intention in creating the particular 
sanction.  If the sanction pursues both preventive and retributive objectives, it must be 
regarded as criminal in nature.103  Although the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its guarantees do not apply directly in Community law, it serves as a 
source of inspiration for the rights and guarantees in Community law.104  This is yet 
another reason why the purely formal qualification of a sanction as administrative 
rather than criminal—as in Regulation 1/2003 and the ECJ judgment in Käserei 
Champignon105—does not suffice to avoid the strict formality of the criminal law. 
                                                          
 100. Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15 (2) of Regulation 17 and 
Article 65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty, 1998 O. J. (C 9) 3. 
 101. Until then, the usual practice was to calculate the fine based on the turnover from the products 
involved in the infringement. In 1998, the Commission switched from this “turnover-proportional” fining to the 
imposition of a lump-sum on the basis of the worldwide total turnover of the enterprise concerned. 
 102. The Commission based the change in its administrative practice of setting fines on the discretion 
granted by Art. 15 (2) Regulation No. 17/62. The CFI has not objected to this view.  See Case T-15/99, Brugg 
Rohrsysteme, 2002 E.C.R. II-1613, para. 124. For a critical view see H.-J. Hellmann, in WIRTSCHAFT UND 
WETTBEWERB 944, 947 (2002); C. Korthals and A. Bangard, in BETRIEBSBERATER 1013, 1016 (1998); A. 
Möhlenkamp, Die europäische Bußgeldpraxis aus Unternehmenssicht, in INSTRUMENTE ZUR DURCHSETZUNG 
DES EUROPÄISCHEN WETTBEWERBSRECHTS 121, 129 (J. Schwarze ed.). 
 103. European Court of Human Rights, Case 8544/79, Öztürk v. Germany, 1984 Series A No. 73,  para. 53, 
in: Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1985, p. 62 (67); Cases No. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 
5370/72, Engel et al. v. The Netherlands, 1977 Series A No. 22, para. 34 et seq., in EUROPÄISCHE 
GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 221, 232 (1976); Case No. 9912/82 Lutz v. Germany, 1987 Series A No. 123,  
para. 54, in EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 399, 401 (1987); see also I. APPEL, VERFASSUNG UND 
STRAFE—ZU DEN VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHEN GRENZEN STAATLICHEN STRAFENS 286 (1998); A. HEITZER, 
PUNITIVE SANKTIONEN IM EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT 17 (1997). 
 104. G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias, in EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 20 (2002).  For the special 
significance of the ECHR for EC-law see also Case C-7/98 Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. I-1935, para. 
25 et seq.; Case 299/95, Kremzow v. Austria, 1997 E.C.R. I-2629, para. 14; Case T-15/99, Brugg Rohrsysteme 
v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-1613, para. 106. 
 105. Case C-210/00, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 
2002 E.C.R. I-6453. 
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The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) takes a position 
similar to that of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the law of 
misdemeanors (Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht). Misdemeanors, although different from 
crimes, are considered penal in the broader sense because they represent the 
retributive avengement of unlawful behavior through reprobation by the state.106  
According to the well-established case law of the German Constitutional Court, the 
fundamental constitutional guarantees of criminal law also apply to fines under the 
law of misdemeanors because of the similarities between the two branches of law.107 
In sum, it seems inappropriate to deny guarantees usually granted in criminal 
procedures only on the grounds that the measure is of administrative nature.  The 
formal qualification as an administrative measure is not sufficient grounds for a denial 
of criminal procedure guarantees. The specific purpose and the concrete impact of the 
particular sanctions should also be examined.  The standards and scope of judicial 
review of sanctions should vary according to their character.  When the purpose of the 
administrative provision is retribution and deterrence, the European Courts should 
adhere to the standards of criminal law and not permit balancing between individual 
rights and efficiency or other administrative policy interests.  This would be in line 
with the opinions of various Advocates General who have also opposed considering 
sanctions mere administrative measures and who have referred to them as criminal in 
nature.108  It might be that sanctions lead to the reform of administrative procedure and 
improved legal guarantees.  In French administrative law, which is in many ways the 
root of European administrative law, disciplinary measures against civil servants led 
to the development, in the Conseil d’Etat, of rights of defense, especially the right to 
be heard in administrative proceedings.109  The application of criminal law guarantees 
like nulla poena sine culpa and nullum crimen sine lege would be a further step in 
improving the European administrative procedure of sanctions. 
                                                          
 106. H.-H. JESCHECK AND T. WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS 58 (4th ed., 1988); I. Appel, 
Verfassung und Strafe—zu den verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen staatlichen Strafens 239. 
 107. For the long line of cases of the German Constitutional Court, see BVerfGE 26, 86, 203; BVerfGE 32, 
373, 383; BVerfGE 38, 348, 371; BVerfGE 42, 261, 263; BVerfGE 71, 108, 114; J. Bohnert, in, KARLSRUHER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN, (K. Boujong ed. 2d ed., 2000), Einl. OWiG paras. 
112; K. Rogall, in KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN (K. Boujong ed., 
2d. ed. 2000) § 3 OwiG para. 5; I. Appel, Verfassung und Strafe—zu den verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen 
staatlichen Strafens, 239, 505, 507.  Appel speaks of a criminal-law-type situation, the dangers of which have 
to be met by the specific criminal law procedural guarantees. 
 108. Cases T-1/89 to T-4/89 and T-6/89 to T-15/89, Rhône-Poulenc SA et al. v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. II-
867 (884); Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. I-8417, para. 31. 
 109. See, e.g., Decision of the Conseil d’Etat of June 20, 1913, Téry Rec. 736, in M. LONG, P. WEIL, G. 
BRAIBANT ET AL., LES GRANDS ARRÊTS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 156 (11th ed., 1996); 
Observations, id. at 157, 158; see also A. DE LAUBADÈRE, J.-C. VENEZIA, AND Y. GAUDEMET, II DROIT 
ADMINISTRATIF 166 (10th ed., 1995); G. VEDEL AND P.DELVOLVÉ, I DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 284 (12th ed. 
1992). For its relevance within Community law, see especially LORD MACKENZIE STUART, THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 32 (1977); C. D. Ehlermann and D. Oldekop, Due Process in 
Administrative Procedure, in FIDE, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, RAPPORTS DU 8ÈME 
CONGRÈS, 11.1-11.20, 22-24 Juin 1978. 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial review procedural requirements in European administrative proceedings 
is of crucial and ever–increasing importance.  Three aspects deserve particular 
attention. 
First, as a general tendency, the greater administrative powers are thought to be, 
the more strict will be judicial review of administrative procedure.  The rigorous 
control of administrative procedure is particularly intended to counter-balance the far-
reaching discretionary powers of the executive.  One might even say that discretionary 
powers can be conferred upon an administration body in conformity with the rule of 
law only if, at the same time, a procedural counterweight is created. 
Second, the analysis has demonstrated that judicial review of administrative 
procedure is integral to the protection of fundamental rights.  Procedural guarantees in 
the administrative process, together with the ability to go to court to vindicate those 
guarantees, constitute fundamental rights and call for unconditional enforcement.110 
Finally, regarding the future development of judicial review, the standards for 
imposing sanctions—such as in the agricultural sector or in competition law—demand 
special attention.  For sanctions that are penal in character, the strict, clear, and formal 
principles of criminal and criminal procedure law—nullum crimen sine lege and nulla 
poena sine culpa—should apply. 
In conclusion, the European Courts should continue to counteract the increasing 
powers of the administration with intensified judicial review of procedural 
requirements. 
 
                                                          
 110. Administrative law may even be described as materialised constitutional law, as the former President 
of Germany’s highest administrative court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) has done it with regard to German law. 
F. Werner, Verwaltungsrecht als konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht, DEUTSCHE VERWALTUNGSBLÄTTER 527  
(1959). 
